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Academics working on military ethics and serving military personnel rarely have 
opportunities to talk to each other in ways that can inform and illuminate their respective 
experiences and approaches to the ethics of war. The workshop from which this paper 
evolved was a rare opportunity to remedy this problem. Our conversations about First 
Lieutenant (1LT) Portis’s experiences in combat provided a unique chance to explore 
questions about the relationship between oversight, accountability, and the idea of moral 
risk in military operations. In this paper, we outline a particular experience of 1LT Portis’s 
that formed the basis of our discussions, before elucidating the ethical issues this 
experience raised. In particular, we see 1LT Portis’s experience as, first, illustrative of the 
problem of moral risk – when military personnel are placed in situations of moral 
temptation. The problem of moral risk, we propose, is best understood through the 
framework of the military’s duty of care. Second, we see his experience as highlighting 




call a toxic warrior identity — a distorted form of the moralized warrior identity1 — can 
negatively affect the attitudes of military personnel toward rules, policies, procedures, and 
accountability mechanisms, particularly in relation to non-combat related roles and duties 
and when leaders must choose between competing bureaucratic demands. We see 1LT 
Portis’s experience as illustrative of these tensions, yet his experiences also highlight 
important concerns about the impact of increasing bureaucratic demands on military 
functioning. In the conclusion, we address the need to balance concerns about toxic warrior 
identity with legitimate criticisms of overly demanding bureaucracy and suggest avenues 
for further research on this issue. 
 
1. The case study2 
In 2007, while deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2006-2008, I had an 
additional duty position known as the Battalion Pay Agent. In this capacity, I would 
withdraw large amounts of US dollars from a finance office located on an American 
Forward Operating Base (FOB), FOB Taji, and then pay that money to local contractors to 
fund construction projects and micro-grants to improve the local infrastructure and 
economy. My job was to account for the money, pay the contractors, provide receipts and 
	
1 Toxic warrior identity can come in degrees. Some distortions of warrior identity may be 
less serious than others in terms of their impact of the behavior and attitudes of military 
personnel.  
2 The case study is told in the first person from 1LT Portis’s perspective. The rest of the 




billing statements, and secure the money during and between patrols to pay the local Iraqi 
contractors. I commonly withdrew between $10,000 and $100,000 at a time, and I rarely 
had any physical security while withdrawing the funds or oversight from my superiors 
when I paid the money to the contractors. I would simply go to the finance office, provide 
legal documents that justified the amount of money I needed, and withdraw the cash. From 
there, I would methodically record each serial number on a spreadsheet before sticking the 
money in my backpack and walking out the door. The denominations were almost always 
$100-dollar bills, and my fingertips were always black when I walked out of the building 
because, as I counted the money, the oils from my hands would rub off some of the ink 
from the crisp, uncirculated greenbacks. In truth, my experience was not unlike many other 
pay agents I knew in Iraq during that era of the war. 
 
The first time I walked out of the building - alone and with $10,000 in my backpack - I was 
taken aback by the fact that no one was watching me. I was a bit stunned to realize how 
much trust my military leaders had placed in me. I was a twenty-six-year-old first lieutenant 
(1LT) and had previously been a platoon leader and executive officer in charge of soldiers’ 
lives and millions of dollars’ worth of equipment, so I had proven my trustworthiness. 
However, the type of trust required for my new responsibilities felt different because I 
wasn’t subject to the same level of oversight and accountability as in my previous positions. 
What’s more, dollar bills would be way easier to conceal than a humvee, and money 





I remember thinking how easy it would be for a mal-intended individual to take advantage 
of the system and falsify records to skim money off the top, which actually happened in 
other areas of operation. For example, while I was drawing money out of the FOB Taji 
finance office, a West Point classmate, Michael Nguyen, was doing the same on the other 
side of the Tigris River, except that much of the money that Nguyen withdrew never made 
it into the hands of the locals. Over the course of the deployment, Nguyen stole nearly 
$700,000 that was intended for the Iraq reconstruction. He would mail the money home to 
himself, stuffed in combat boots or uniform items. When he redeployed home to Fort 
Lewis, WA, he opened bank accounts and made large purchases like a new BMW. He 
might have gotten away with stealing the money and getting it out of Iraq, but his lavish 
lifestyle made his superiors, and eventually the government, suspicious (Associated Press 
2009).  
 
Whenever the money was not at the finance office, it was in one of two places: in a safe in 
my office, or on my person. Regulations required the money be in a safe, though I was the 
only one who knew the combination and the safe was chained to the floor in my office. For 
added security, the door to my office - which I did not share with anyone - remained locked 
whenever I wasn’t occupying it. The double lock and key gave me confidence that it 
wouldn’t be stolen. I don’t remember ever talking about the money with other officers, 
though it was no secret to the leaders in the unit that I was the pay agent and my job was 
to withdraw cash and pay it to local contractors. If someone had wanted to take the money 
by gunpoint or by force they could have, though I was constantly surrounded by other 




was in my battalion area under lock and key, my risk of being robbed or having the money 
stolen was negligible. That simply wasn’t a concern. However, because I did not have 
oversight even during those times - no inspections, no internal inventories, no one else 
having access to the safe - someone in my position would have had enough autonomy to 
skim money off the top and dispense of it however he or she desired. There was next to no 
oversight when the money wasn’t on my person. 
 
When the money wasn’t in the safe, it was on my person, either en route between the 
finance office and the safe in my office, or on a payment mission that required me to join 
a patrol off of the FOB to a nearby village or joint security station. It was when I was 
transporting the money between the finance office and my office that I incurred the most 
risk. Because my only protection was me and my sidearm, I knew that if someone — a 
group of soldiers or interpreters or local nationals — had wanted to rob me, they would 
have met minimal resistance. It was during these times that I was most vulnerable. 
Consequently, it was because of these moments of transiting the money that I asked my 
Squadron Commander to lend me his personal security detachment (PSD) for my 
subsequent withdrawals. I knew many of the soldiers on the PSD, and I trusted them. If 
they were with me during those missions, this would effectively eliminate the risk of being 
overwhelmed and robbed. At first, the senior commander resisted. If he loaned me his PSD, 
then he wouldn’t be able to patrol his subordinate unit’s area of operations off of the FOB. 
But, when I pushed the issue and explained my concerns, the commander agreed that I 
could use them whenever the PSD wasn’t in use. I deconflicted his schedule from there. 





The other time the money was on me was whenever I was on missions to pay local 
contractors. On these missions, I usually accompanied the company commander and had 
plenty of security while off the FOB. Whenever I paid the contractors, I always gave the 
money only after they provided me with a receipt or bill of laden. Furthermore, I insisted 
on taking pictures of me handing the money to the Iraqi contractors, added proof in case I 
ever lost the paperwork. If a contractor ever claimed that I hadn’t paid them in full, I could 
produce their receipt, their signature, and a picture that proved I had paid them the money. 
The receipt was part of the paperwork I owed to the finance office in order to clear my 
balance from the previous funds withdrawal; the photo, however, was voluntary. But if I 
had wanted to only pay an Iraqi contractor $8,000 even if I owed him a $10,000 payment, 
the contractor likely still would have provided a receipt and signature, regardless of the 
size of the payment. After all, they were communicating through an interpreter and no one 
else ever controlled any of the money. In short, the surest way to steal money from this 
program would have been to skim it off the top and cover my tracks by taking advantage 
of the actual contractor with whom we were working. And had I - or any other pay agent - 
wanted to do that, there would have been ample opportunity to do so by exploiting the 
language barrier, the differences in power and authority between the US military and the 
local Iraqis, and by the simple fact that no one seemed to be providing a second set of eyes 
throughout this process. 
 




During our conversations about this case study, we identified several ethical issues in this 
case. The most obvious ethical issue is the ease with which the money could have been 
misappropriated. However, our focus in this paper will be on a different aspect of the case 
that we believe raises more pressing ethical issues: the lack of oversight.3 We see the lack 
of oversight as raising two related issues: 1) the dangers of “moral risk” – circumstances 
in which military personnel are placed into situations of moral temptation due to an 
apparent lack of concern for security and accountability and 2) problematic attitudes 
towards accountability and oversight within the military. We see these attitudes as 
illustrative of, on the one hand, legitimate concerns about the extent of bureaucratic 
demands on military personnel and, on the other hand, of toxic forms of the military’s 
	
3 There are two additional set of ethical issues that relate to the moral imperatives of placing 
soldiers in positions to “develop” occupied countries during reconstruction efforts. Firstly, 
the participation of soldiers in reconstruction efforts that are outside the scope of traditional 
military duties raises questions about the training needed for such roles, and questions 
about the appropriateness of soldiers making decisions (intentionally or unintentionally) 
between the “haves” and “have nots.” But the issue of lack of oversight that we identify is 
not unique to these non-traditional military operations. Secondly, the money that was 
marked for reconstruction was US money that had originally belonged to the Iraqi 
government. So, one important question is: what are the ethics of taking back US money 
that had belonged to the Iraqi people and then deciding who gets to use it and for what? 
We see questions such as this as important and worthy of exploration, but we will not be 




moralized warrior identity that are likely to manifest in situations where time constraints 
force leaders to choose between fulfilling competing bureaucratic requirements.4 Below, 
we explore each of these in turn. Our goal is not to provide a solution to the ethical 
questions raised by 1LT Portis’s experience, but to explore and map out the different ethical 
dimensions of the case and suggest some avenues for further research and discussion.  
 
2.1. Moral risk, moral injury, and the military’s duty of care  
What is moral risk? 
This case study is remarkable both in the high degree of autonomy and responsibility given 
to 1LT Portis and in the low level of oversight provided by the military. He had no physical 
security, even though he was regularly withdrawing over $10,000 at a time, and while he 
did track serial numbers and submit receipts for the funds, no one else ever counted the 
payments he made to contractors. This lack of supervision makes one wonder if the 
military’s organizational systems made it permissible for mid-level leaders to not care, or 
at least not verify, whether those dollars were used for their intended purposes. The lack of 
oversight shows a willingness to subject an officer to both physical risk and moral risk - 
physical risk, because of the risk of robbery to which he was exposed, and moral risk, 
because of how easy it would have been for him to behave unethically, given the lack of 
oversight. Moral risk occurs when a person is placed in a situation in which it is possible 
	
4 To be clear, we are not claiming that 1LT Portis’s superior officers were operating from 
a toxic warrior identity. But, their behavior is consistent with attitudes toward 




for them to engage in clearly unethical behavior with little chance of being caught or 
punished. Of course, not everyone will engage in unethical behavior when placed in such 
situations. But, since we have reason to be skeptical about the efficacy of character alone 
in preventing unethical behavior,5 it is irresponsible to hope that a person’s internalized 
moral code will be sufficient to ensure ethical behavior in the absence of external oversight 
and accountability. 
 
In the case study described above, moral risk is present in two prevailing ways. Firstly, 
moral risk refers to the risk of negative consequences that could result from the unethical 
use of the money. These consequences include not only the potentially negative 
consequences for 1LT Portis had he stolen the money, but the impact of such theft on the 
projects for which the money should have been used. Secondly, moral risk refers to the risk 
to the moral character and even the identity of military personnel placed in situations such 
as the case study we are considering. The lack of oversight and the relative ease with which 
a person could engage in unethical behavior in this and similar cases could undermine the 
capacity and willingness of military personnel to restrain themselves in similar situations. 
Much as we would like to believe that military personnel have the inner moral resources to 
resist temptation, the range of ethical scandals that have plagued all services of the military 
in the last decade casts doubt on the belief that military personnel have greater moral 
“willpower” than other individuals placed in similar situations (a point we shall explore 
	
5 See, e.g., Doris & Murphy 2007. For discussion and critique of the situationist claims, 




further in the next section). Furthermore, the relaxed	attitude toward accountability and 
safety demonstrated by Portis’s superior officers could easily lead military personnel to 
take a dismissive or similarly lax attitude toward other kinds of accountability measures in 
other military activities.  
 
The military’s duty of care 
One way to think about this concern is through the framework of the military’s duty of 
care. It is uncontroversial that the military, like other high-risk professions such as policing 
or firefighting, has a duty of care to its members to ensure they are not placed in situations 
of unnecessary or excessive danger. For example, the military has an obligation to 
adequately house, feed, and provide medical care for its members and, arguably, an 
obligation not to expose them to excessive or unnecessary risk.6  
 
The existence of a duty of care may be uncontroversial, but the extent and scope of this 
duty of care is not uncontroversial. For example, some authors writing in military medical 
	
6 See Nikki Coleman, Does the Australian Defence Force have a compelling justification 
for the duty to obey orders? (UNSW Canberra School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 
2016): 60. The existence of and justification for the military’s duty of care is not 
straightforwardly reducible to or explained by the moral principles of jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello. Instead, it is based on the fact that members of the military profession are likely 
to be placed in situations of danger and that is true regardless of whether a war is just or 




ethics have questioned whether the military has the right to compel military personnel to 
take prophylactic or untested medications (e.g., see Wolfendale & Clarke 2008). Others 
have framed this issue in terms of workplace safety, arguing that military personnel might 
have a moral right to disobey orders if those orders place them in situations of unjustified 
risk, such as orders to fly a plane that has failed recent safety inspections (Coleman 2016).7  
 
Typically, the debate about the scope of the military’s duty of care to military personnel 
has been framed as a conflict between different conceptions of military necessity and 
soldiers’ rights. For example, how far and for what reasons is the military justified in 
exposing military personnel to the risk of physical harm? How are such calculations to be 
made, and by whom should they be assessed? What rights do military personnel have if 
they are placed in a situation that they feel exposes them to unjustified risk?  
 
	
7 Military personnel may not have a legal right to disobey such orders, however. According 
to the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the only type of order that a soldier 
can legally disobey is an unlawful one. If the order is immoral and/or unnecessarily puts 
the soldier in harm’s way - as might be the case of flying a plane that failed a maintenance 
inspection - the UCMJ may in fact uphold the order. Now, of course, any soldier can 
disobey any order - and a soldier may well disobey an order to fly a plane that failed an 





We suggest that the idea of moral risk falls within the military’s duty of care to military 
personnel because of the effect that situations involving moral risk can have on the moral 
health of military personnel. The military has a duty of care to limit the exposure of military 
personnel to situations of moral risk because moral risk not only increases the likelihood 
that military personnel will commit unethical acts, but also because moral risk can distort 
the moral capacity of military personnel in ways that can cultivate morally problematic 
attitudes toward proper constraints on behavior in combat that can lead to further unethical 
behavior.   
 
In addition, for some military personnel exposure to situations of moral risk could result in 
moral injury. There are several different definitions of moral injury, but a representative 
definition is as follows: “Moral injury is a particular type of psychological trauma 
characterized by intense guilt, shame, and spiritual crisis, which can develop when one 
violates his or her moral beliefs, is betrayed, or witnesses trusted individuals committing 
atrocities” (Jinkerson 2016, 122).8 Moral risk, as we have described it, is not synonymous 
with moral injury and situations of moral risk do not inevitably lead to moral injury. A 
soldier could be placed in a situation of moral risk yet feel no qualms whatsoever about 
taking advantage of that situation. But, situations of moral risk could result in moral injury 
in two ways. Firstly, military personnel who commit unethical acts in situations of moral 
	
8 This raises the question of the military’s responsibility to treat military personnel who 
suffer from moral injury – a responsibility that arguably falls under the military’s duty of 




risk might experience excessive guilt and shame. 9  Secondly, military personnel who 
witness others committing unethical acts in situations of moral risk could experiences a 
sense of betrayal. In addition, a soldier’s awareness of being placed in a situation of moral 
risk by her superior officers could also be a source of moral injury because it indicates a 
lack of concern on the part of those officers for her moral wellbeing and the moral standards 
that are supposed to govern military conduct.  
 
So, the concern about moral risk that we see as relevant to this case study is a concern that 
has ramifications for the prevention of unethical behavior in the military more generally 
and the scope and nature of the military’s duty of care to military personnel. If the military 
is genuinely committed to reducing moral risk for soldiers, then the military institution 
needs to pay attention to a) minimizing exposure to morally risky situations, b) inculcating 
internalized respect for the law and accountability mechanisms and c) modeling respect for 
the law and accountability throughout military operations. 
 
	
9 Note though that guilt and shame may be morally appropriate responses to committing 
wrongful acts. Describing all such responses as forms of “moral injury” is misleading, 
given the association of injury with impairment of health. Appropriate feelings of guilt and 
shame at one’s wrongdoing are evidence of moral health, not of injury that is in need of 
repair. Indeed, it is the lack of such feelings that might be more accurately characterized as 




At this point one might object that the Army (and other services) already exercise this 
responsibility for the moral wellbeing of military personnel by educating its members 
through classes in ethics, training them on proper protocols for handling money, and by 
subscribing to values that connote honorable living (i.e., the Army Values). In Portis’s 
formal undergraduate education, for example, he (along with other West Point graduates) 
had to take a philosophy course, which included topics like Kantian ethics and Just War 
Theory. As a commissioned officer, he attended legal briefings intended to keep leaders 
informed about the decisions they make or enforce, and he received specific training on 
handling money.  
 
It is of course true that military academies typically instruct military personnel in ethics 
and relevant laws and policies and rely heavily on values statements to inculcate morally 
appropriate behavior. However, current approaches to military ethics training are arguably 
insufficient to minimize the problem of moral risk for two reasons. Firstly, many enlisted 
military personnel simply do not receive substantive ethics training. Secondly, the kinds of 
ethics training that military personnel do receive is, arguably, inadequate to the task of 
instilling genuine ethical behavior.10 Such training may be too limited in scope, fail to 
address relevant research on the relationship between ethical behavior and situational 
	
10 See, e.g., Wolfendale 2015. While West Point’s recent Special Leader Development 
Program for Honor (SLDP-H) had shown improvements in Cadet behavior in relation to 
honor code violations (Fernandez 2019), this success has been undermined by recent 




factors, and/or does little to prevent unethical behavior when such behavior is encouraged 
or tolerated by superior officers and/or reinforced through informal socialization practices 
and norms. Current approaches also fail to grapple with the disconnect between the 
attitudes towards ethics and values that we see in military academies, and the attitudes 
towards ethical (and legal) constraints that can occur “on the ground.” One of the things 
we think the case study highlights is a problematic attitude toward the need for certain 
kinds of oversight and accountability. Indeed, it was the lack of oversight that particularly 
struck Portis when reflecting on his experiences.  
 
However, while reducing moral risk may be an important part of the military’s duty of care, 
perhaps encouraging soldiers to internalize respect for all rules, regulations, and 
accountability measures (and encouraging compliance with all such rules) would be 
counterproductive, because the number of such rules hinder effective military functioning, 
fail to take into account the needs and circumstances of military operations “on the 
ground,” and distract military personnel from core military roles and responsibilities. In 
this view, cases like Portis’s highlights problematic attitudes towards accountability 
measures but also raises questions about the impact of bureaucracy on military functioning 
and identity.  
 
 2.2. Conflicts between bureaucracy, warrior identity, and effectiveness.  
The attitudes that military personnel of all ranks have toward the legal, administrative, and 
bureaucratic rules that govern their actions play an important role in the degree to which 




and beliefs about the military’s core function or purpose and the self-identity of military 
personnel and thus impact which accountability measures are viewed as essential as 
opposed to those which may be inessential or tangential. Therefore, underlying conceptions 
of the nature and meaning of military service and military self-identity have a profound 
impact on how seriously military personnel view the different accountability measures to 
which they are subject and how ethical lapses in the military are perceived. 
 
In this case study we see this dynamic play out. On the one hand, we see an attitude of care 
toward the use of the money insofar as Portis’s leaders knew there was a finite amount of 
money, and they believed that it could do good to employ young men who may otherwise 
gravitate toward supporting Al Qaeda, and to support the creation of local jobs and 
infrastructure. On the other hand, as we have seen, despite the care with which grant 
applications were assessed, there was little practical oversight over the process of drawing 
the money and paying it out. His superiors simply trusted 1LT Portis to do his job and that 
he could furnish paperwork to prove it – and account for the money – at any point that he 
needed to. The difference between 1LT Portis and his West Point classmate Michael 
Nguyen was that Portis’s receipts and paperwork were authentic, while Nguyen’s were not. 
Now, it’s possible that the reason for this lack of oversight was that there was a legitimate 
concern that adding more bureaucracy to the process would slow down the timeline for 
making payments, and this, in part, was why leaders were so prone to use those funds. If 
they needed it quickly, they could get it. However, a cursory search reveals Michael 
Nguyen was not the only officer who defrauded the government through this financial 




either did not view the proper tracking of this money as a priority or held a (as it turned 
out) naive belief that all the officers appointed to handle money would remain honest and 
resolute while being exposed to positions characterized by high moral risk and low 
oversight.  
 
Whether or not 1LT Portis’s leaders were motivated by trust or by indifference toward his 
handling of the money, this case study raises questions both about appropriate levels of 
accountability and oversight in the context of military operations in a combat zone and 
about the appropriate attitudes that military personnel should have toward such 
accountability mechanisms. Put simply, we see this case study as highlighting tensions 
between the moralized warrior model of the military profession, toxic variants of this 
model, and increasing bureaucratic demands on the time and resources of military 
personnel.  
 
The moralized warrior model of the military profession 
It has long been noted that the American military is “both profession and bureaucratic 
organization” (Crosbie & Kleykamp 2018, 524). The idea of the military as a profession 
refers broadly to the military’s autonomy regarding areas of military expertise11 combined 
	
11 What these areas of expertise are has been the subject of much debate, which we will not 
address here. For example, Samuel Huntington defines the military’s professional expertise 





with a commitment to a set of guiding ethical ideals and internalized virtues. The moralized 
model of the military profession is reflected in the content and form of commissioning 
sources and professional military education (PME), ethics education, and the many core 
value statements found on the websites and training materials of each arm of the military 
(Mattox 2013).  
 
According to the moralized warrior model, the military profession is founded on shared 
values and a shared identity based around traditional martial virtues.12 The role of military 
ethics education is to inculcate these shared values and shared identity in military personnel 
across all services (perhaps in different degrees, depending on rank) not only to constrain 
the behavior of military personnel but to create an internalized motivation to go above and 
beyond what mere duty might require. To develop, according to one account, an ethic “that 
must embody the moral aspirations of the military, typically understood as traditional 
martial virtue and honor, in order to inspire military professionals toward supererogatory 
conduct” (Jennings & Hannah 2011, 551).  
	
Navy, and Airforce are “three distinct military professions ... each identified with the 
physical domain in which their warfare expertise resides” (2015, 15).  
12 This is the most prominent conception of military identity and values in PME and in 
much work in military ethics. See, for example, French 2003 and Sherman 2005. There are 
far too many recent works in military ethics to list here. A brief survey, for example, of the 
articles published in this journal provides a good indication of the continued acceptance of 





Peter Jennings and Sean Hannah argue that a moralized conception of the purpose and 
function of the military profession is necessary for the “moral legitimacy” of the profession 
(2011, 551). Without such a moralized foundation, it is difficult to see how the distinctive 
function of military profession – specifically, the use of lethal force – could be morally 
justified. As Jennings and Hannah put it, given that military personnel will engage in the 
“preeminent military task – killing and dying,” this must be made “morally redeeming both 
for those who undertake the task and for the society they serve” (2011, 552). The only way 
to do this, in their view (and in the views of many others who write on military ethics), is 
to shape military identity around a core set of martial virtues, including honor, sacrifice, 
duty, and courage (e.g., Macintyre 2015). While the best methods for inculcating such 
virtues are the subject of much debate, many military ethicists argue that internalized virtue 
is both the appropriate framework and goal for military ethics education and is likely to be 
the most effective method of mitigating the likelihood of unethical behavior.13  
	
13 See, for example, MacIntyre 2015, Sherman 2005, and Snow 2009. A related question 
is whether and to what degree all soldiers are required to develop this moralized foundation. 
Some might argue that it is more important that senior officers do so than junior officers 
or enlisted personnel. Certainly, the emphasis on values statements and ethics training is 
greater in officer training than it is in basic training for enlisted personnel. Alternatively, 
given junior officers’ crucial role in shaping the attitudes and behavior of personnel under 
their command, such training may be equally, if not more, important at that level. We don’t 





There are two implications of the moralized warrior model for understanding the behavior 
of military personnel. Firstly, in this model military personnel are held to a higher moral 
standard than members of other organizations. They are expected to act according to 
comprehensive set of ethical values and internalize a set of virtuous character traits, not 
just do their jobs. Secondly, in the moralized model, unethical behavior is liable to be 
construed as resulting from the actions of a few “bad apples” (Crosbie & Kleykamp 2018, 
523) - individuals who have failed to live up to or internalize the military’s image of the 
ethical warrior - rather than, say, being caused by systemic or structural problems. If 
unethical behavior is framed as a “bad apples” problem, proposed solutions to instances of 
unethical behavior are likely to focus on improved ethics training or methods of 
internalizing virtue (e.g., MacIntyre 2015, Snow 2009) rather than structural reform or 
increased supervision or accountability mechanisms. 
 
The moralized warrior conception of the military is, arguably, the dominant conception of 
the military profession among writers in military ethics (and among many military 
personnel). However, an obvious challenge to this model is the number of serious and (in 
some cases) ongoing ethical lapses that have occurred in all arms of the military, ranging 
	
education may currently vary according to rank, the dominance of virtue and value 
language at all levels of service (for example, in the core values statements of each service) 
suggests that the moralized warrior identity of military service is intended to be internalized 





from the commission of war crimes including torture and the killing of civilians, to 
numerous cases of bribery, cheating, mismanagement, widespread dishonesty, and sexual 
assault (See Crosbie & Kleycamp 2018, 23; Wong & Gerras 2015). For example, a 2015 
US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute report found extensive evidence of 
routinized dishonesty including “dishonest training practices, incomplete inventories, and 
falsified medical reports” (Lilley 2015; Wong & Gerras 2015). In December 2020, it was 
revealed that 70 West Point Cadets had been accused of cheating on their exams (Romo & 
Bowman 2020). An April 2020 Pentagon Report on sexual assault in the military found 
that, despite decades of training programs, rates of sexual assault had not declined and, 
indeed, sexual assault reports went up in 2018-2019 (Myers 2020). And in November 2020 
a report on the command climate at the Army base at Fort Hood, Texas, found that “there 
was an environment at Fort Hood that allowed sexual assault and harassment to proliferate” 
(Rempfer 2020).  
 
We do not have space here to discuss all the factors that contribute to these cases of 
unethical and illegal behavior. But there is one common factor that is particularly relevant 
to our discussion: in many of the cases mentioned above, those involved in perpetrating 
unethical acts and/or covering them up displayed a lax attitude toward, if not outright 
disregard for, safety and accountability mechanisms such as training programs and 
reporting requirements. One explanation for this disregard is frustration with the burden of 
adhering to accountability and reporting requirements while at the same time trying to 
properly prepare military personnel for their jobs. For example, many officers interviewed 




dishonesty on the grounds that constantly increasing demands for compliance with ever-
changing rules and regulations (such as mandatory training sessions) were so time-
consuming and impossible to satisfy that they hindered more important military objectives 
like providing soldiers enough time to train on operating their combat vehicles at night or 
preparing for company-wide maneuvers and live fire exercises. According to the report, 
“many Army officers, after repeated exposure to the overwhelming demands and the 
associated need to put their honor on the line to verify compliance, have become ethically 
numb. As a result, an officer’s signature and word have become tools to maneuver through 
the Army bureaucracy rather than being symbols of integrity and honesty” (Wong & Gerras 
2015, ix).  
 
The concern that administrative tasks can undermine essential military preparation and 
training is an important one, but to attribute the lack of regard for accountability 
mechanisms solely to this concern is to miss another source of disregard for such measures: 
a toxic warrior identity. In some of the cases mentioned above, the disregard for 
accountability mechanisms reflected and reinforced a distorted normative judgement on 
the part of officers (junior and senior) about what being a warrior entails, and what traits, 
attitudes, and behaviors “true” warriors display.  
 
For example, in their report Wong and Gerras document a particularly dismissive attitude 
toward training designed to prevent sexual assault and harassment. Wong and Gerras quote 
a captain who speaks about the difficulty of completing mandatory Sexual Assault 




operations. This officer said, “We needed to get SHARP training done and reported to 
higher headquarters, so we called the platoons and told them to gather the boys around the 
radio and we said, ‘Don’t touch girls.’ That was our quarterly SHARP training” (2015, 28). 
On the one hand, this officer is raising the concern, mentioned above, that the burdens 
imposed by mandatory reporting and training requirements are too great. But, on the other 
hand, this officer’s attitude toward sexual assault prevention is undeniably dismissive. 
Despite the continuing high rates of sexual assault and harassment in the military, this 
officer clearly does not see sexual assault prevention training as a priority in comparison 
to his other duties. In either case, the lack of oversight and accountability, as well as the 
dismissive attitude toward critical training, set the conditions for this subordinate leader to 
act on his own initiative. This can lead both to the circumvention of necessary training 
when a leader is forced to pick and choose between tasks that cannot all be fulfilled and 
highlights cases where such conditions make it easier for leaders to compromise an 
honorable warrior identity. 
 
The Fort Hood report similarly documents a lack of enforcement of, and respect for, the 
SHARP Program: “Rather than viewing SHARP as a critical component of Soldier safety, 
morale, and respect, NCOs and officers at the Company/Troop level and below, treated 
SHARP as a perfunctory task, not a priority” (Fort Hood Independent Review Committee, 
2020, 17-18). Other research has found that such attitudes toward the SHARP program are 
a factor in the persistence of high rates of sexual assault and harassment in the military 





The failure of prevention and training programs around sexual assault and harassment 
suggests the lack of enforcement cannot be attributed simply to the added administrative 
burden imposed on officers and instructors by programs like SHARP. Rather, according to 
Elizabeth Jean Wood and Nathaniel Toppelberg, disdain for these programs and the 
continued toleration of sexual assault and harassment in the military has its roots in 
informal socialization practices that cultivate what they call a form of “‘hyper masculinity’ 
– an exaggerated form of masculinity characterized by beliefs in dichotomous, polarized, 
and stereotypical gender roles; the valorization of control, power, competition, and pain 
tolerance; the celebration of heterosexual virility; and the denigration of traits associated 
with femininity” (Wood & Toppelberg 2017, 624). This is an extreme form of a toxic 
warrior identity, in which traits such as courage, toughness, and loyalty are distorted by 
practices such as “hazing and abusive, sexualized language targeting women and others 
perceived as weak” (Wood & Toppelberg 2017, 628), the use of sexual assault as a 
punishment for women and men who don’t meet gender norms, and commanders and 
instructors at military academies and bases who do not enforce the policies and “may mock 
the training” (Wood & Toppelberg 2017, 627). 
 
The 2020 Brereton report, documenting evidence of war crimes (including 39 murders) 
committed by Australian Special Forces soldiers in Afghanistan from 2007-2012, similarly 
illustrates the effects of a toxic warrior identity built around the valorization of the 
tolerance for, and the infliction of, pain and the rejection of rules and procedures as 
antithetical to true warrior identity. This report found that a “warrior-hero culture of 




more confident over time, ‘a law unto themselves’, and these ‘behaviours [the killing of 
civilians] became permissible and equated with being a good and effective soldier’. For 
some rotations, a new team member fresh into theatre who hadn’t yet shot someone would 
be required to shoot a prisoner, ‘to pop his cherry...to prove that he was up to it’” (IGADF 
2020, 516).  
 
Lesser degrees of a toxic warrior identity can undermine respect for and adherence to 
accountability mechanisms when warrior identity becomes synonymous with combat roles. 
The conflation of the “paradigm of the masculine-warrior" with training for and 
participating in combat (Do & Samuels 2021, 26) is evident in U.S. military training, 
despite the fact that many military personnel, if not most, occupy roles that have little to 
do with combat. This means that traditional conceptions of warrior identity and warrior 
values may not reflect the experience of many military personnel. For example, Air Force 
personnel almost never engage in one-on-one combat with an adversary and only four 
percent are pilots (even fewer are fighter pilots). Yet, nonetheless, the language of 
“warriors” is used through cadet training (by officers, other cadets, and in the names of 
events and locations, such as “Operation Warrior” and “Warrior Run”) and Air Force basic 
training explicitly evokes combat models of identity involving:  
 
… a construction of masculine work, which includes themes of danger and 
hardship, where cadets become “hyper-invested” in a warrior identity 
through training conditions simulating combat … this indoctrination 




power, toughness, dominance, aggressiveness, and competitiveness, 
resulting in an image of a “combat, masculine warrior.” (Do & Samuels 
2021, 27).   
 
This discrepancy between this combat-based warrior identity and the reality of military 
service for most military personnel is striking. Indeed, even military personnel who are 
trained for combat roles may never face combat: “a soldier may go the entirety of his or 
her career training and preparing for a day or moment that never arrives” (Robillard 2017, 
205). This means that the moralized conception of military personnel as warriors guided 
by an internalized set of warrior virtues may not only fail to match the experiences of many 
military personnel; it may also leave them ill-prepared for the duties that they are required 
to undertake.  
 
But lack of preparation is only one potential problem arising from this disconnect between 
a warrior identity based around combat and the reality of military service. Not only may 
military personnel be ill-prepared for non-combat roles, but roles or missions that require 
traits like empathy or cultural sensitivity,14 such as peacekeeping or humanitarian missions, 
may be viewed with disdain. For example, the Brereton report notes that “Australian forces 
	
14 This is particularly likely when emotional traits and behaviors traditionally associated 
with feminine gender roles are derided and criticized. For example, Do and Samuels 
describe how male Air Force cadets “who fail tests of masculinity often are discredited as 




began to align themselves towards a ‘Warrior mentality’ culturally at odds with the mission 
that was still supposed to be based on a ‘hearts and minds’ approach” (IGADF 2020, 515). 
Additionally, as Michael Robillard argues, a toxic warrior identity can lead soldiers and 
officers to engage in higher risk activities including, “unnecessary initiations of combat 
engagements as well as unnecessary acts of risk-taking, self-sacrifice, and sometimes 
martyrdom” (2017, 216).  
 
The scope and range of the ethical failures described above challenge the moralized warrior 
model of the military that is prevalent in PME and in military ethics literature in at least 
two ways. Firstly, these cases raise doubts that the moralized warrior model creates military 
personnel who are held to a higher ethical standard, and are more ethical and honorable, 
than members of other professions. For example, even cases of extremely serious immoral 
acts, such as rape, did not result in serious punishment and were covered up by those who 
engaged in them and their superior officers. Secondly, these failures raise concerns about 
whether current military training and socialization practices (both formal and informal) are 
cultivating an honorable warrior mentality or a laying the groundwork for a toxic warrior 
identity. The rhetoric of warrior identity is one of honor, courage, duty, and loyalty. But if 
military personnel internalize forms of a toxic warrior identity because of socialization 
practices that reinforce and reward distorted versions of warrior traits, then ethical lapses 
are likely to continue. 
 




1LT Portis’s experience, we believe, illustrates how the moralized warrior model can 
potentially affect attitudes and behavior “on the ground” in problematic ways (particularly 
in relation to non-combat tasks and responsibilities) and also highlights the problems of 
increasing bureaucratic demands on military personnel, particularly when operating in 
stressful and complex combat arenas, whether at home or abroad. The administrative 
processes involved in assessing the grants and distributing the money are characteristic of 
bureaucratic approaches to military operations involving “[r]epetitive situations, work 
done by following SOPs, administrative rules, and procedures” (Snider 2015, 18). But, 
while 1LT Portis’s role occurred in the context of a deployment to a combat zone, the tasks 
of assessing grant applications and distributing funding are well outside the traditional 
conceptions of a warrior identity. Portis recalls other pay agents lamenting their positions 
as “signing checks” rather than “pulling triggers.” That is to say, some of his counterparts 
privileged operational jobs over staff positions. It is possible, therefore, that one 
explanation for the lack of oversight of 1LT Portis’s and others’ actions is that their 
superior officers did not see these tasks as part of the military’s central mission, and 
therefore viewed these tasks as less important compared to other, more traditionally 
martial, military operations. This is consistent with the dismissive attitude toward non-
traditional roles and toward rules and procedures that were documented in the Fort Hood 
and Brereton reports and in other cases of ethical lapses. But, it is also possible that Portis’s 
senior officers simply trusted him (with good reason) to fulfill his responsibilities without 
requiring significant oversight and viewed the bureaucratic and administrative 
requirements involved in tracking money payments as a unnecessary hindrance to 




bureaucratic requirements (SOPs, rules, policies, reporting requirements, and so forth) can, 
if taken too far, undermine the military’s ability function as a military. For example, a 2002 
U.S. Army War College study found that “company commanders somehow have to fit 297 
days of mandatory requirements into 256 available training days” (Wong 2002, 9), and a 
review of a 2015 Fort Leavenworth study found that there was “nearly 20 months of annual 
mandatory training crammed into a 12-month calendar” (Burke 2016). Simply put, there 
are literally too many requirements on an annual basis to be able to accomplish them all.15 
So, what we see in 1LT Portis’s experience is a combination of two issues related to 
attitudes towards accountability requirements and other bureaucratic demands. On the one 
hand, 1LT Portis’s experience illustrates how elements of the moralized warrior model can 
foster a dismissive attitude toward administrative and bureaucratic requirements that are 
viewed as not part of “real” (read: combat) military. On the other hand, this case study 
highlights problems with the burden of accountability requirements currently in place. And 
when bureaucratic requirements are excessively time-consuming, officers have to make 
	
15 This is not the first time the military has grappled with this idea. In 1979, amidst the 
burgeoning bureaucratic requirements of the post-Vietnam War military, then-Army chief 
of staff General Edward “Shy” Meyer suggested that one way to empower junior leaders 
might be to support a notion of “selective disobedience” (Barno 2014, Washington Post). 
According to LTG (ret.) David Barno, who was an infantry company commander at the 
time, the idea resonated with him not because he could “ignore laws or violate ethical 
standards,” but because the “policies, regulations and requirements vastly exceeded the 




decisions about which accountability mechanisms to prioritize and which to ignore or 
“work around.” While these judgments can reflect trust in subordinate personnel, it is also 
in these situations that a toxic warrior identity can influence those decisions in ways that 
can be extremely harmful, as we have seen.  
 
What follows from recognizing these issues? If we reject a moralized model of the military 
because of the dangers associated with toxic versions of the moralized warrior identity, we 
are faced with a dilemma: How do we reconcile the need for a moral foundation for the 
existence and use of military force (specifically, the use of lethal force) with increasing 
bureaucratic demands? We have two responses to this dilemma. Firstly, it is important to 
understand that accountability mechanisms (rules, training programs, reporting 
requirements, and so forth) are not necessarily in conflict with a moralized conception of 
the military profession. Accountability mechanisms can reinforce important moral norms 
related to, for example, respect and care for military personnel.16 Secondly, the moralized 
warrior model is not the only way of conceiving of the moral foundation of the military 
and the self-identity of military personnel. As we have seen, formal and informal 
socialization practices and training can create a toxic warrior identity that can promote and 
sustain unethical behavior, including the toleration and perpetration of sexual assault and 
war crimes, and this gives us good reason to consider alternatives to this model. For 
example, some military forces, such as the Dutch military, adopt a conception of the 
military’s moral identity that combines a warrior identity with a peacekeeping and 
	




humanitarian identity (op den Bujis et al. 2019). But whether or not such alternative 
conceptions of military identity are viable for the U.S. military depends on the willingness 
of the military (and military ethicists) to entertain radical revisions to the self-conception 
of military personnel, and to take steps to actively counter toxic warrior identities at all 
levels of training and socialization. As is clear from the failure of SHARP and “no 
tolerance” policies about sexual assault and harassment, this requires far more than creating 
new policies and rules; it requires a genuine reckoning with the formal and informal 
practices that sustain toxic warrior identity and a genuine openness to considering non-
combat military service as “real” military service. This will require leaders at all levels to 
identity and confront practices, attitudes, and behaviors that inculcate toxic warrior 
identities; exercise greater oversight of programs, initiatives, and missions that are most 
important to all aspects of military functioning and, if doing so in a climate that mandates 
more tasks than can be accomplished, prioritize for their subordinate commands what is 
truly important.  
 
4. Concluding thoughts 
In this paper we have used 1LT Portis’s experience to highlight several ethical issues 
connected to oversight and accountability. We see the case study as illustrating a new area 
of concern for the military’s duty of care – the potential for moral risk – and as highlighting 
problems with toxic forms of moralized warrior model of the military profession combined 





If the tension between too many “mandatory requirements” and “not enough time” cannot 
be resolved, this can create further situations of moral risk, particularly when combined 
with a dismissive attitude toward bureaucratic requirements that do not chime with 
traditional conceptions of the military warrior identity. This raises the question of whether 
the military’s duty of care might require senior military leaders – and congressional leaders 
– to both reduce the bureaucratic requirements put on subordinate leaders and to ensure 
that military personnel take seriously those requirements that are necessary for the 
protection, wellbeing, and integrity of all military personnel (whether it is in regards to the 
individual soldier proficiency on weapons systems or Sexual Harassment/ Assault 
Response Prevention training). As we noted above, this may require a thoroughgoing 
revision of the moralized warrior model of the military profession and a willingness to 
consider alternative moral conceptions of the military profession and the identity of 
military personnel. In light of such a revision, it must be understood that rules, training, 
and accountability practices that are designed to protect military personnel from moral risk, 
and to protect vulnerable military personnel from assault and harassment, are not 
antithetical to the military’s moral foundation and purpose. Such rules must be understood 
as sustaining the military’s core moral foundation, rather than acting as a hindrance to the 
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